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COLLAPSING SPHERES: JOINT TERRORISM TASK
FORCES, FEDERALISM, AND THE WAR ON TERROR
SUSAN N. HERMAN*
INTRODUCTION
The war on terror has created new frontiers in federalism. Joint
Terrorism Task Forces [JTTF] operate on one of those frontiers.
As Willamette University College of Law's 2005 symposium,
"Laboratories of Democracy: Federalism and State Independency,"
demonstrates, Oregon in general and Portland in particular are the
pacesetting "laboratories" for our country's experiments in federal-
ism.1 The people of Portland are highly aware that the Supreme
Court has not resolved all issues about when claims of local auton-
omy will trump the federal government's claim of national interest.
There are several different ways in which the federal war on ter-
ror has attempted to enlist state and local law enforcement officials as
its "hands and feet." 2 An early example was a fall 2001 FBI program
of interviewing, with the aid of local law enforcement officials, thou-
sands of Arab and Muslim men around the country.3 A more current
example is the expanded use of Joint Terrorism Task Forces.4 These
hybrid federal/local law enforcement programs have created a variety
* Centennial Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A. Barnard College, 1968;
J.D. New York University School of Law, 1974. The author would like to thank Jason Maz-
zone, Ann Althouse, Kent Robinson, and Norman Williams for their comments, Brandon
Johnson for his research assistance, and Brooklyn Law School for the continuing support of its
research stipend program
1. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.").
2. See Chief Joseph Samuels, President's Message at the Meeting of the International
Association of Chiefs of Police, Strengthening the Relationship with Our Federal Partners
(Apr. 17, 2003) (quoting Attorney General John Ashcroft), available at http://www.
theiacp.org/documents/index.cfin?fuseaction-document&documentid=438.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 25-33.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 43-74.
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of ambiguous relationships between federal and state or local offi-
cials, whether they are working together or in parallel, and have mud-
dled the lines of authority and accountability that have characterized
our dual sovereignty model of federalism. Both federal programs
have met with general acceptance throughout most of the country, but
not in Portland.
The issue roiling the Portland City Council when Willamette's
2005 symposium took place was whether to extend Portland's partici-
pation in a JTTF for another year.5 In April 2005, after the sympo-
sium, Portland decided to withdraw its officers from the JTTF.6
The people of Portland discovered that the secrecy surrounding
anti-terrorism efforts and investigations makes it a real challenge to
maintain local control of local law enforcement officials engaged in
joint federal/local enterprises. Portland decided to maintain its auton-
omy within its own sphere of operations, to maintain accountability of
the executive branch officials within their pay, and to maintain legis-
lative control of policy decisions that otherwise might disappear into
the city's executive branch. The debates that took place over these
issues in Portland are an interesting model for the rest of the country,
where the issues Portland took so seriously barely seem to have been
noticed.
In this article, I will first describe, in Section I, how the Supreme
Court's dual sovereignty paradigm has been challenged by the war on
terror. Section II will discuss the federalism issues raised by the Joint
Terrorism Task Forces. These task forces do not come close to vio-
lating the constitutional principles of federalism the Supreme Court
has set forth 7 because they are the product of voluntary agreement
rather than compulsion. Nevertheless, even though Portland can
choose whether or not to participate, the form of cooperation created
by these joint ventures challenges the ability of any state or city to
5. See Larry Abramson, Portland Weighs FBI Pact, Privacy Concerns (NPR radio
broadcast, Feb. 11, 2005). A hearing on renewal of participation had been scheduled for De-
cember but was then postponed to allow the succeeding, newly elected city officials to decide
the issue. Henry Stem, Portland May Pull Out of FBI Task Force, THE OREGONIAN, Dec. 21,
2004, at BO1 ("Debate on the task force, as in past years, deeply divided the community.").
6. See Sarah Kershaw, In Portland, Ore., a Bid to Pull Out of Terror Task Force, N.Y.
TIMES Apr. 23, 2005, at A9; http://www.aclu-or.org/issues/terrorism/pjttf/PDX JTTFRevised
Resolution04O2805.htm (last visited May 29, 2005) (substitute resolution, passed by City
Council by a 4-1 vote on April 28, 2005); ACLU Applauds Portland City Council Ending Role
in FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, at http://www.aclu-or.org/issues/terrorism/pjttf/PJTTF
MainPage.htm (last visited May 29, 2005).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 13-24, 103-104.
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maintain accountability of its employees, to maintain any heightened
state or local protection of civil rights and civil liberties, and to main-
tain its own structures governing policy-making authority.
The war on terror has precipitously shifted a tremendous amount
of power to the executive branch of the federal government and
minimized the role of Congress and the courts,8 at the risk of under-
mining the United States Constitution's horizontal system of checks
and balances. These joint federal and state/local enterprises might be
viewed as weakening the vertical structures of the United States Con-
stitution by collapsing previously autonomous spheres. Portland's
experiences with the Joint Terrorism Task Force, like other fed-
eral/state skirmishes over the allocation of decision-making authority,
also reveal that the war on terror can disrupt a locality's internal sys-
tem of governance by forcing a shift of the center of policy-making
gravity away from legislative bodies and toward the executive
branches, where accountability and transparency are minimized.
Section III.A will describe another attempt by a city legislative
body to control its local employees: an ordinance in Arcata, Califor-
nia that threatens city officials with a fine of $57 if they officially as-
sist or voluntarily cooperate with federal agents wielding Patriot Act
powers of which Arcata disapproves. 9 The issues concerning preser-
vation of local autonomy in the face of the federal government's con-
ceded right to conduct its own investigations using its own tools any-
where in the country, and the local legislature's struggle to maintain
its own policy-making role rather than allow its executive officials to
decide for themselves how to deal with federal government requests
for assistance or cooperation are the same issues that confronted the
Portland City Council in the context of the JTTF debate. Section
III.B will go on to describe a contrasting approach to the assertiveness
of the Arcata City Council: the experience in New York City, where
city executive officials have been allowed to make essentially unilat-
eral decisions about the manner of their cooperation with federal anti-
terrorism efforts. In one example, the New York Police Department
went into court to ask to be relieved of limitations on their surveil-
lance powers imposed by an earlier consent decree. In another, three
different New York City mayors coped with the question of
8. See, e.g., Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying
the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002) (discussing separation of powers and
checks and balances issues created by the President's military tribunal order).
9. See infra text accompanying note 80.
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city/federal relations with respect to the local enforcement of immi-
gration law, all without substantial participation of the New York City
Council. 0
In Section IV, I will describe a few instances in which all
branches of state or local government have been preempted by federal
law or policy from making their own decisions about their manner of
cooperation in the federally led war on terror, including a New Jersey
freedom of information law requiring disclosure of the identities of
occupants of local jails that was found to be preempted by an interim
rule issued by the INS Commissioner when the law would have been
applied during the fall of 2001 to reveal the names of federal detain-
ees being held in the state's jails under contract with the federal gov-
ernment. 11 If such preemption is valid, could the Oregon law whose
welfare was at the center of the Portland City Council's debates be
simply swept out of the way if the United States Attorney General
were to decide to preempt that law?
I. THE DUAL-SOVEREIGNTY PARADIGM
Although federal and state/local law enforcement officers have
worked together in the area of crime control in the past, 12 our para-
digmatic model for these ventures has been a dual sovereignty model.
Under this model, each "sovereign ' 3 has a sphere of operations14 in
which it makes its own policy decisions; each controls the executive
branch officials it hires to implement its policies; each decides how
and to whom its officers will be accountable for their actions, includ-
ing the extent of civilian review of its law enforcement activities. Al-
though state and local officials must follow the dictates of the federal
Constitution, any state may decide to exceed the floor of federal con-
stitutional protection by providing more rights for suspects and de-
fendants within its own sphere. Through its own state constitutional
decisions, statutes, regulations, and common law, each state (and to
10. See infra text accompanying notes 84-93.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 108-13.
12. See Daniel C. Richman, The Changing Boundaries between Federal and Local En-
forcement, in 2 BOUNDARY CHANGES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE ORGANIZATIONS 81 (Nat'l Inst.
of Justice ed. 2000).
13. Under the dual sovereignty model, states are sovereigns; the role of state subdivi-
sions, counties, and municipalities, is more ambiguous. See infra text accompanying note 104.
14. See Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State
Power, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1485 (1987) (exploring the different motivations ofjudges in draw-
ing the boundary lines between the separate state and federal spheres).
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some extent local government) can define what will be considered to
constitute intolerable abuse in law enforcement and can decide what
measures to take to counter what it defines as abuses. Law enforce-
ment agents must follow the law of each higher entity in the hierar-
chy--city police, for example, must follow applicable city, state, and
federal restrictions-and may ignore the restrictions of those lower in
the hierarchy. Thus, because the law is cumulative, the officers are
not placed in the position of Pavlov's dogs, asked to follow inconsis-
tent sets of commands. A state may not impose any rules or restric-
tions that conflict with its federal obligations; a locality may not im-
pose any rules that conflict with its federal or state obligations.
Officers need only combine the applicable sets of rules and, by fol-
lowing the most demanding, will be in compliance with all.
The Supreme Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence has created
a strong incentive for keeping federal and state criminal enforcement
efforts discrete. Because of the Court's dual sovereignty exception, a
person may be prosecuted by two different jurisdictions for the same
offense, but only if the officers of those jurisdictions have not cooper-
ated too much during the initial investigation and prosecution. 15  I
have explained previously how this double jeopardy law can actually
impede the implementation of federal interests. 16 Federal officials are
discouraged, for example, from offering their assistance in a state
civil rights prosecution, and encouraged to sit by and watch a state
prosecution flounder so that they can preserve the possibility of initi-
ating their own successive prosecution.'
7
15. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 123-24 (1959) (describing an exception to dual sov-
ereignty successive prosecutions where the dual nature of the proceedings is a "sham" because
authorities from the second jurisdiction have been heavily involved in the investigation or
prosecution in the first).
16. See Susan N. Herman, Reconstructing the Bill of Rights: A Reply to Amar and Mar-
cus's Triple Play on Double Jeopardy, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1090, 1094-1106 (1995) (arguing
that the Supreme Court's decision to adopt a competitive dual sovereignty model as opposed to
a cooperative federalism model was not dictated by the Constitution).
17. This, of course, happened in the case of the prosecution of the Los Angeles police
officers charged in federal court with violating the civil rights of Rodney King after having
been acquitted in state court, as well as in other notorious cases like that of Lemrick Nelson,
who was acquitted in state court of murdering Yankel Rosenbaum and then charged in federal
court. The order of prosecution can also be reversed. Paul Hill, who was convicted of a fed-
eral offense under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances statute, 18 U.S.C. § 248, for kill-
ing a doctor who worked at an abortion clinic, was re-prosecuted in state court for murder be-
cause the state wished to impose a heavier penalty than had been available under federal law.
See Herman, supra note 16, at 1090 nn. 1-3.
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Going a step further in enforcing the separation of federal and
state crime control efforts, the Supreme Court in Printz v. United
States,18 interpreted the Tenth Amendment and principles of federal-
ism to prohibit the federal government from "commandeering" state
or local law enforcement officials to assist in implementing federal
criminal law. The federal government was prohibited from enlisting
local law enforcement officials to help conduct background checks on
people within their jurisdictions who applied for gun permits.' 9 As in
the dual sovereignty area, one of the Court's chief concerns in Printz
was its desire to preserve separate spheres in which the dual sover-
eigns will operate. 20 According to Justice Scalia, author of the major-
ity opinion, the lines of federalism are fixed 2' and no matter what the
circumstances, the federal government must hire its own enforcement
officials to implement federal programs, unless the state is given a
choice whether or not to cooperate and voluntarily decides to do SO. 2 2
The federal program, no matter how important, can be permitted to
flounder unless Congress musters the funding to employ sufficient
federal personnel to implement the program or to bribe state and local
officials to participate, so that the lines of accountability will not be
blurred.23 Justice Scalia's opinion in Printz suggests that in addition
to the Tenth Amendment, various provisions of Articles I-III embed
the principle that there must be dual spheres of sovereignty.24
During the fall of 2001, there was a moment where it appeared
that this anti-commandeering model might spawn an exception for
federal anti-terrorism efforts. The FBI wished to question thousands
of Arab and Muslim men around the country, not because they were
18. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
19. Id. at 902-904. The local law enforcement officers were being asked to provide assis-
tance on an interim basis until a federal system became operative. Id.
20. Id. at 921-22. Justice Scalia quoted THE FEDERALIST No. 51, maintaining that the
separation of the two spheres provides a "double security" for protecting liberty and checking
tyranny. Id.
21. See id. at 932-33 (describing the Court's conclusion that the states cannot be com-
pelled to administer a federal program as "categorical" and declaring that balancing federal
against state interests as inappropriate where the federal law in question compromises the
structural framework of dual sovereignty).
22. Id. at 928. If the states do not have a choice, maintained Scalia, they could become
the "puppets of a ventriloquist Congress." Id.
23. Id. at 929-30 (suggesting that the Constitution contemplates that the state govern-
ments will represent and remain accountable to their own citizens). The argument about lines
of accountability reiterates a concern expressed by Justice O'Connor in New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992), see infra text accompanying notes 88-89.
24. Id. at 924.
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suspected of terrorism or any crime, but to find out whether they had
any useful information. Lacking the manpower to conduct so many
interviews, the FBI asked local police chiefs and sheriffs to assist with
the interviews.25 The request for local assistance was reminiscent of
the request to local law enforcement officers condemned in Printz: the
local officers were asked to share their experience with and knowl-
edge of local residents as well as to provide sheer manpower to assist
with the federal investigation.
Most local law enforcement officials were eager to cooperate,
but not all. Portland, Oregon Chief of Police Mark Kroeker noted that
Oregon has a state law, O.R.S. § 181.575 (2003),26 which prohibits
police from collecting or maintaining information about the political,
religious, or social views of any individual or group unless the infor-
mation is part of a criminal investigation and there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the subject is or may be involved with crimi-
nal conduct.27 The Portland City Attorney expressed the opinion that
some of the questions the FBI wished to pose, if asked of people as to
whom there was no "criminal nexus," would violate the state law.
28
While federal agents are empowered, under the Supremacy Clause
29
to violate state law while implementing a federal program, state and
local officers are not. Whether the Portland police might be asked to
violate their own employer's law by participating in the interviews
was not the only issue that surfaced. The Chief of Police of Detroit, a
25. See Fox Butterfield, A NATION CHALLENGED: THE INTERVIEWS; Police Force
Rebuffs F.B.I. on Querying Mideast Men, N.Y. TIMES Nov. 21, 2001, at B7.
26. O.R.S. § 181.575 provides:
No law enforcement agency, as defined in ORS 181.010, may collect or maintain in-
formation about the political, religious or social views, associations or activities of
any individual, group, association, organization, corporation, business or partnership
unless such information directly relates to an investigation of criminal activities, and
there are reasonable grounds to suspect the subject of the information is or may be
involved in criminal conduct.
O.R.S. § 181.575 (2003).
27. The law evidently was enacted as part of a compromise to allow employers to get
criminal background information on prospective workers. It has not been interpreted by any
appellate court, although Portland has been sued a few times for retaining information about
political activists, including the intriguingly named case of (Douglas) Squirrel v. (then Chief of
Police Charles) Moose, in which the plaintiff alleged that the police had gathered information
on Squirrel and other activists who participated in political demonstrations. See Rop Zone,
Portland Chief Denies City Not Cooperating: He Says Police Aiding U.S. Terror Probe, THE
SEATrLE TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at B6.
28. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Federal Effort Does Not Violate Law, Oregon Attorney
General Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2001, at B8.
29. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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community with a substantial number of Arab and Muslim residents,
expressed his own concern that playing the role of a federal terrorism
investigator and questioning Arab and Muslim men in his community
on behalf of the FBI could compromise his relations with members of
his community and impede his ability to do the job he was being paid
to do.3°
In the fall of 2001, any objection or refusal to cooperate in any
respect with the federal government's anti-terrorism program was po-
litically loaded. Chief Kroeker, in a subsequent appearance on a na-
tionally televised program on CNN,3' proclaimed repeatedly that he
and the Portland police were "participating 100 percent" with "every
effort of the federal government in Portland" including the Joint Ter-
rorism Task Force. "Our heart is there," he said, "but it's the law., 32
The Portland interpretation of how Oregon law applied to these inter-
views proved controversial. Both the Oregon Attorney General and
Multnomah County District Attorney opined that state law did not
prevent Portland police from asking the questions on the FBI's list
because the interviews were voluntary. 33 The interviews proceeded,
after some negotiations about who would ask what, without requiring
any judicial intervention or interpretations of what the Tenth
Amendment would or would not have required or prohibited. The
FBI might have had to negotiate harder in some areas to work out
who, as between federal and local agents, would ask what questions
under what conditions, but the issue was settled without the interven-
tion of constitutional doctrine and thousands of Arab and Muslim men
were questioned. Because the issue was resolved politically, under
the watchful eye of the media and the public, there was no need for
any court to decide whether or not, as in Printz, the local law en-
forcement officials had a constitutional basis for declining to render
their assistance.
Time has passed and it is no longer politically impossible for a
state or local official to question aspects of the federal government's
anti-terrorism program or even to threaten to withhold cooperation.
30. Fox Butterfield, A NATION CHALLENGED: THE INTERVIEWS; Police Are Split on
Questioning of Mideast Men, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, at Al.
31. Mornings with Paula Zahn, American Man Found Fighting on Taliban Side in Af-
ghanistan; FBI May Be Easing Restrictions About Spying on Domestic Organizations (CNN
television broadcast, Dec. 3, 2001).
32. Chief Kroeker's solution was that to be on the safe side, federal agents rather than
state or local agents should interview the 23 men involved. See Zone, supra note 27.
33. Zone, supra note 27; Verhovek, supra note 28.
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Seven states and 378 cities and counties have now passed resolutions,
based on a Bill of Rights Defense Committee [BORDC] model, con-
demning provisions of the USA PATRIOT ACT34 and other aspects
of the federal government's anti-terrorism activities.35 Portland
passed such a resolution on October 29, 2003;36 Multnomah County
passed a similar resolution on December 9, 2004. 37 These resolutions
are based on three premises: 1) under the Supremacy Clause, a state
or local entity cannot impede a federal investigation that conforms to
federal law, 38 no matter how much the local residents dislike the fed-
eral powers being used; 2) in our system of federalism, localities can
and should weigh in on the making of federal policy; 39 and 3) state
and local governments are entitled to make decisions governing the
conduct of their own employees. Some of these resolutions recognize
and assert that state and local law enforcement officials need not
themselves follow federal procedures with which they disagree, even
if those procedures are found to be acceptable under the federal Con-
stitution, and they may instruct local officers not to use the disap-
34. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
35. See Bill of Rights Defense Committee, http://www.bordc.org (last visited June 8,
2005) (listing the seven states as Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Montana, and Ver-
mont).
36. Portland USA Patriot Act Resolution, at http://www.bordc.org/portland-res.htm de-
tail.php?id=86 (last visited June 8, 2005) (affirming that the war on terrorism requires coopera-
tion of cities and states, and also 1) affirming Portland's "strong support for the First Amend-
ment right of public demonstrations, vigils, protests, marches and similar forms of protected
expression of ideas and views without fear of prosecution under federal terrorism laws," 2)
expressing Portland's "strong opposition to the indefinite detention of people who have not
been charged with a crime; and measures that target individuals for legal scrutiny or enforce-
ment activity based solely on their religion or country of origin," and 3) requesting Oregon's
members of Congress to work to limit the Patriot Act and to enact other legislation attentive to
civil liberties concerns).
37. Multnomah County USA Patriot Act Resolution, at http://www.bordc.org/detail.
php?id=67 (last visited June 8, 2005).
38. Whether or not all of the controversial provisions of the Patriot Act are constitutional
has not yet been decided for a number of reasons, including the secrecy surrounding their use.
See Susan N. Herman, The USA Patriot Act and the Submajoritarian Fourth Amendment, 41
HARV. Civ. RTs.-CIV. LIB. L. REv. (2006) (forthcoming) (arguing that the current Fourth
Amendment bar, as set by the Supreme Court, is so low that it is not surprising that "the peo-
ple" believe they are entitled to more protection of privacy than the courts may guarantee).
39. See Vikram David Amar, Is It Appropriate, Under the Constitution, for State and
Local Governments to Weigh in on the War on Terror and a Possible War with Iraq? (Mar. 7,
2003) at http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/amar/20030307.html (last visited June 8, 2005)
(comparing the BORDC resolutions to the traditional role state and local governments have
played in fighting disfavored federal legislation ever since the Virginia and Kentucky resolu-
tions opposed the federal Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798).
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proved tactics in their own investigations. 40  Some of the resolutions
also raise questions about how far the Supremacy Clause requires
state and local entities to go in actively cooperating with federal en-
forcement efforts with which they disagree.4'
The same day the Portland City Council passed its own version
of this resolution, the Council also agreed to renew Portland's partici-
pation in a Joint Terrorism Task Force for that year. 42 It was only af-
ter several years of debates and a change of the relevant elected offi-
cials that Portland decided in 2005 not to renew its participation.
II. JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCES AND FEDERALISM
A. The Features and Critiques of the JTTF
According to the FBI's website, Joint Terrorism Task Forces
[JTTF's] are "teams of state and local law enforcement officers, FBI
Agents, and other federal agents and personnel who work shoulder-to-
shoulder to investigate and prevent terrorism." 43  Although JTTF's
were first used in 1980, their number has doubled since September
11, 2001.44 There are now 66 JTTF's, including one in each FBI field
office and others in smaller offices.45 More than 2,300 personnel
work on these task forces nation-wide. 46 The task forces are supposed
to be a two-way street, enlisting the numerically superior manpower
of the states and localities 47 to complement federal efforts, on the one
hand, and sharing information gathered by the federal government
with state and local enforcement officials on the other. Some have
questioned whether the states and localities are indeed giving more
than they receive,48 but this is one of the many questions that cannot
40. See, e.g., Arcata, CA resolution, infra note 80.
41. See, e.g., Hawaii's Senate Resolution, at http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2003
/bills/scrl 8_.htm (last visited June 8, 2005) (opposing use of state funds, "to the extent legally
possible," to monitor political and religious gatherings exercising their First Amendment
rights).
42. See Stem, supra note 5.
43. Joint Terrorism Task Force, at http://www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/counterterrorism /part-
nership.htm (last visited June 8, 2005).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. State and local police officers outnumber FBI agents 60 to 1. Id.
48. See Alasdair Roberts, Big Brother Keeps Secrets Under Wraps, THE POST-
STANDARD, December 19, 2004, at C1.
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be publicly debated in any meaningful manner because of the level of
secrecy surrounding the operations of the JTTF's.
The terms governing each of these cooperative ventures are set
forth in a Memorandum of Understanding [MOU] between the local-
ity and the FBI, the terms of which are often kept secret from the pub-
lic. 49 The draft MOU the Portland City Council considered has been
made public.50 Under its terms, it appears that Portland police officers
assigned to the Portland JTTF [PJTTF] continued to be paid by the
city, although their overtime was paid by the federal government.
5
'
Local officers were sworn in and deputized as Special Federal Offi-
cers and received appropriate federal security clearances; 52 they were
required to agree not to disclose any classified or sensitive informa-
tion to non-JTTF members without the express permission of the FBI
and to sign non-disclosure agreements; 53 and they were considered to
be federal employees "for purposes of defending claims arising out of
JTTF activity.
' 54
These sections created a somewhat ambiguous, hybrid status for
the Portland police participants. On the one hand, they continued to
be Portland employees by dint of their salaries and supervision; on the
other, they were subject to control by the FBI in a number of respects,
including the need to get the FBI's permission before disclosing in-
formation about investigations and their own roles in those investiga-
tions. The section constituting the Portland police officers as federal
employees for purposes of defending claims could be read to provide
those officers with immunity against a lawsuit for violating a state
law that provides more rights to targets of investigation than federal
law-like O.R.S. § 181.575." Other sections of the memorandum
provided that state law was not to be supplanted or undermined. Re-
sponsibility for the conduct of the Portland officers remained with
their Portland police supervisors; their participation was subject to re-
49. See id. (discussing the requests for disclosure of MOU's which were denied by Los
Angeles and New York Police Departments). The ACLU has filed a Freedom of Information
Act suit seeking information about the terms of these agreements. See Noelle Crombi, ACLU
Wants FBI to Lift Its "Cloak" on Surveillance, THE OREGONIAN, Dec. 3, 2004, at A01.
50. See Draft of Oregon's Memorandum of Understanding, at http://www.aclu-or.org/
issues/terrorism/pjttf/PJTTF%20MOU%2010_04.html (last visited June 8, 2005).
51. Id. at section VIII.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at section IX.
55. O.R.S. § 181.575 (2004); see supra note 26 for text.
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view by the Portland police Lieutenant "to insure compliance with
applicable Oregon statutes and laws, 56 and the memorandum explic-
itly stated that "in situations where the statutory or common law of
Oregon is more restrictive of law enforcement than comparable fed-
eral law, the investigative methods employed by the state and local
law enforcement agencies shall conform to the requirements of such
Oregon statutes or common law.",
57
Thus Portland contractually agreed that its officers would remain
subject to state and local law and not fully become federal agents
permitted to operate under less constrained federal procedures. De-
partment of Justice guidelines, for example, now permit placing an
undercover agent in a political or religious meeting even without any
suspicion that anyone at that meeting meets the criminal nexus re-
quirement Oregon law imposes.58 Oregon officers are prohibited
from acting in the absence of a criminal nexus, and must also limit
their involvement in immigration raids. 59 The document is fairly clear
in its instruction to the Portland police officers to follow the greater
demands of state law, and former Mayor Vera Katz had declared her-
self satisfied that the Portland police were complying with state law.
60
Current Mayor Tom Potter, the former Portland Chief of Police, has
proved more difficult to satisfy.
Opponents of PJTTF participation regarded the MOU's attempts
to assure respect for the more demanding Oregon state law as insuffi-
cient. First, they were wary of simply trusting assurances that state
law is being respected when they would not have been able to review
whether or not those assurances are accurate.61 One commissioner
said, "I'm not going to take it on faith that the federal government is
using our officers in compliance with Oregon law." 62 The chief issue
became how to provide for civilian oversight of the police given the
56. Draft of Oregon's Memorandum of Understanding, section III B, at http://www.
aclu-or.org/issues/terrorisni/pjttf/PJTTF%20MOU%2010 04.html (last visited June 8, 2005).
57. Id. at section IV. C. See also id. at Section III. C. ("Failure to abide by local, state, or
federal law by a Portland Police Bureau officer can result in the suppression of evidence in
criminal trials, in civil liability against the City of Portland or individual officers, and in the
criminal prosecution of officers.").
58. See The Attorney General's Guidelines on Federal Bureau of Investigation Under-
cover Operations, at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/tbiundercover.pdf (last visited June 8, 2005).
59. See Zone, supra note 27 (discussing a 1987 Oregon law which prevents police from
enforcing federal immigration law).
60. Stem, supra note 5.
61. Id.
62. Id. (quoting Randy Leonard).
[41:941
FEDERALISMAND THE WAR ON TERROR
veil of secrecy surrounding the operations of the JTTF. Opponents
alleged that abuses of the anti-terrorism authority have occurred else-
where63 and that there is no way for the City Council or the public to
know whether or not there have been or will be abuses, as defined by
Oregon law, in Portland.64 Several different concerns were raised
about the MOU's blurring of the lines of accountability. Under the
MOU, information could be shared with Oregon's United States
Senators and Representatives and with the Mayor if the Mayor could
obtain an adequate security clearance, but not with other civilians, in-
cluding the members of the City Council. 65 During the final round of
negotiations, the FBI declined to offer the Mayor or the council mem-
bers the same top level security clearance as the officers who would
have been assigned to the PJTTF.66 Mayor Potter, a former Portland
chief of police, acted as police commissioner with oversight of the po-
lice department 67 according to Portland tradition. And because of the
non-disclosure agreements, the local police officers might not have
been able to tell the public or the press whether or not any state, local,
or federal agents were spying on religious or political groups or vio-
lating the state's law in any other manner.
The non-disclosure agreement created a distinct possibility that
violation of the state law by Portland employees could go undiscov-
ered. Although the MOU instructed the Portland officers to comply
with state law, it is not clear, given the non-disclosure agreement, that
one of the Portland police officers would have been permitted even to
report a police colleague for joining in a federal effort in disregard of
Oregon law, or even to confess his or her own violation of state law,
as this might entail divulging the details of a clandestine federal op-
63. See, e.g., Testimony of Andrea Meyer, ACLU of Oregon, Portland City Council (Oct.
2003) available at http://www.aclu-or.org/issues/terrorism/pjttf/PJTTFARMTestimony
2003.pdf (last visited June 8, 2005) (testifying that "an anti-terrorism officer of the Sheriffs
department in Fresno, California infiltrated Peace Fresno," a local political group that "was
and is not suspected of criminal activity").
64. The ACLU FOIA suit is designed to uncover whether agents investigating terrorism
are spying on religious or political activities in Oregon, see Crombi, supra note 49. Brandon
Mayfield, a Portland lawyer who was arrested for participating in the bombing in Madrid (a
charge later dropped when federal authorities realized that his fingerprint did not actually
match one found at the scene), was said in court documents to have traveled to and from a
mosque, an activity that constituted one of several reasons proffered as justifying an arrest
warrant. Id.
65. Draft of Oregon's Memorandum of Understanding, section IV B, at http://www.
aclu-or.org/issues/terrorism/pjttf/PJTTF%20MOU%2010_04.html (last visited June 8, 2005).
66. See Kershaw, supra note 6.
67. Id.
2005]
WILLAMETTE LA W REVIEW
eration. Since investigations conducted by the JTTF, especially sur-
veillance of a suspect group, are carried out in secret, the targets of
surveillance would not be likely to know if Portland police officers
were violating state law, or even that they were involved in an inves-
tigation, and so it might be that no one would be able to complain of a
violation even if one did occur.68 There was also concern that the ac-
tivities of the JTTF may not actually be limited to anti-terrorism ac-
tivities in practice, but may spill over to ordinary criminal law en-
forcement.69
The MOU's command to follow state law respecting the gather-
ing of information was clear but, other than sheer trust, there were
few mechanisms for enforcing that command that were not under the
control of the FBI. In addition, because the files created by the JTTF
are considered to be FBI files, they are not subject to the requirement
of state laws that such files be reviewed and purged, which makes it
impossible to enforce the Oregon statute's provision against the main-
tenance of such files.7 °
Another type of accountability argument focuses on the lines of
funding rather than supervision. The JTTFs offer a way for the fed-
eral government to use local law enforcement officers as its "hands
and feet" without footing the bill for their services. As in Printz, the
argument can be made that if the federal government wants man-
power, it must pay instead of conscripting state or local employees.7t
There is also an independent constitutional basis, in the Protection
Clause of Article IV, for arguing that it is the responsibility of the
federal government to protect the people of Portland against terrorist
68. The Fresno episode surfaced by accident when the local undercover agent involved
died in a motorcycle accident and his actual name was published in the newspaper with his
photograph. Some of the peace activists who had been at meetings the agent had attended rec-
ognized his picture, registered the difference in the name he had given them, learned of his
actual employment, and figured out that he had been assigned to spy on their meeting. This
sort of sequence of events is not likely to happen very often. Accord Peace Group Infiltrated
By Government Agent, DEMOCRACY Now!, Thursday, October 9, 2003, at
http://www.democracynow.org/article.plsid=03/l0/09/1556226%20 (last visited June 12,
2005).
69. This has happened in Las Vegas, for example. See Jeffrey Rosen, Prevent Defense,
THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 6, 2004.
70. Testimony of David Fidanque; Executive Director, ACLU of Oregon, at
http://www.aclu-or.org/issues/terrorism/pjttf/JTTFResTestDavidFidanque033005.htm (last
visited June 12, 2005). The files presumably would also be immune from state disclosure laws
and subject only to federal FOIA requests, which may be more burdensome and time-
consuming to litigate. Id.
71. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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attacks.72 If this is true, the salaries of the JTTF participants should
be paid by federal rather than local tax dollars. If the federal govern-
ment is not paying these officers, under this line of argument, the fed-
eral government should not be controlling them even to the extent
provided in the draft MOU. The forms of federal control under the
MOU, particularly control over the dissemination of information rele-
vant to whether state law has been violated, is in some respects tan-
tamount to federal preemption of state law, accomplished by contract
rather than by congressional action. The people of Portland, through
their elected representatives, should have some means of reviewing
the extent of the resources they are offering the federal government.
Not all of the arguments outlined above were raised during the
course of the Portland debates, but the Mayor's and City Council's
concerns about accountability proved decisive. Negotiations ulti-
mately proved fruitless and the FBI refused to offer top security
clearances to the Mayor or city council members. The City Council
therefore voted to withdraw the Portland officers from the PJTTF.73
The agent in charge of the Portland FBI office remarked, perhaps
wistfully, that he knew of no other local government that has pulled
out of a JTTF.74
B. The PJTTF and the Law of Federalism
The Portland City Council provided a dramatic model of dual
sovereignty federalism in action by taking its responsibilities seri-
ously. Portland's conclusion is a logical culmination of the argu-
ments the Supreme Court has accepted in the dual sovereignty arena
and in Printz. The City Council's debates demonstrated how difficult
it is for local policy makers to fulfill their supervisory and policy-
making roles when they cannot have access to relevant information.
This difficulty could have become an excuse for the Council to cede
all decisions to federal decision makers, but the council members
were unwilling to do so. As one Portland Commissioner said "the
onus rests on those of us who were elected to govern the city to make
sure that here in Portland things are going well., 75 The policy makers
72. See Jason Mazzone, The Security Constitution, _ UCLA L. REV. _ (2005) (forth-
coming) (arguing that the federal government's constitutional obligation to protect the states
against invasions and rebellions requires anti-terrorism efforts to be federally funded).
73. See Kershaw, supra note 6.
74. Stem, supra note 5.
75. Id.
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in other jurisdictions may or may not have inserted provisions similar
to those in the PJTTF in their invisible MOU's to ensure that local
law will be respected and civilian oversight and accountability pre-
served. It seems that only in Portland did an official body actively
debate the value of the words on paper.
The federal government cannot, because of Printz, compel par-
ticipation in a JTTF,76 so whether or not to participate is a political
decision. Localities are offered the expertise and intelligence gather-
ing capabilities of federal anti-terrorism agents in exchange for sign-
ing over some of their employees to a certain degree of federal con-
trol. But the policy makers who must decide whether the trade off is
worthwhile cannot know how much intelligence or expertise is actu-
ally being offered, how much federal agents actually control opera-
tions in practice, or whether local officials have actually disregarded
or colluded in disregard of state or local restrictions on investigations.
The members of the PJTTF and their supervisor at the Portland Police
Bureau would have been the only city employees to know what was
happening. The Mayor and council members, with a lower security
clearance, would have been able to share some but perhaps not all of
that information. If the Portland police had become disillusioned or
dissatisfied with the workings of the PJTTF, they could have advised
the City Council not to renew its agreement and the City Council
would then have had to decide whether to accept their recommenda-
tion, probably without having access to the information on which that
recommendation was based. Under those circumstances, it is likely
that the City Council would defer to the officers' superior knowledge
of what had been happening. Thus the real decisions about whether
the trade off of accountability for information is worthwhile would
actually be made by executive branch officials who are less account-
able to the public than the legislature.77
The JTTF structure, mostly because of the secrecy of its opera-
tions, thus impedes the City Council's ability to supervise the activi-
ties of its employees and also, as a practical matter, allows those em-
ployees to have a weighty influence on the decision about whether or
76. Some may argue that there should be an exception to Printz where the federal gov-
ernment is exercising its war powers. See infra notes 115-17.
77. See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and En-
forcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REv. 757 (1999) (discussing the low level of accountabil-
ity of federal law enforcement agents). The Mayor is an exception here, because he is politi-
cally accountable to the voters. Contrast the City Council's lack of opportunity to learn what
the JTTF's are doing with Congress's oversight capabilities.
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not the city will participate. These joint ventures do not commandeer,
but they do interfere with the state or city's usual methods of creating
accountability and allocating decision-making authority. The Tenth
Amendment, as defined in Printz, prohibits coercion; it does not so
far prohibit interference with a state's decision about how to organize
its policy-making authority - the state's separation of powers.
78
Many of the same issues of accountability and autonomy described in
Printz and the dual sovereignty doctrine are implicated, however,
even if Portland's participation is voluntary.
How sharp is the line between cooperation and cooptation? I do
not expect or recommend that the Supreme Court will develop a new
facet to its Tenth Amendment jurisprudence to render this a judicial
rather than a political question. And so it will be the states and locali-
ties themselves, through their policy-making bodies, the legislatures,
which will have to try to draw these lines. The Portland City Council
tried to negotiate the terms of the MOU to provide a greater role for
itself in order to fulfill its obligation to its constituents, but this
proved impossible. 79 Perhaps the reason the MOU's in other jurisdic-
tions have been kept secret is that one or both of the parties is reluc-
tant to publicize the terms of the deal they have structured. The fed-
eral government might well be loath to tell Portland if it has agreed to
a sweetheart deal in some other city; the city officials might well be
loath to let their constituents know that they have signed away their
authority and are simply trusting their own police and the FBI to pre-
vent abuses, including violations of state or local law, from occurring.
It is certainly an inconvenience for the FBI to have to negotiate the
terms of each JTTF separately, but this balkanization is the essence of
our Federalism.
III. LEGISLATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY
A. Arcata and Accountability
Another jurisdiction that has been notably assertive in trying to
maintain local legislative control over local executive branch officials
in the face of potential federal investigations is Arcata, California.
Like many other communities, Arcata objected to various provisions
of the Patriot Act, but recognized that it did not have the power to
78. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997).
79. See Kershaw, supra note 6.
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prohibit federal agents from using those powers in Arcata. Unlike
other communities, which passed only resolutions expressing their
condemnation of various tactics federal agents have been empowered
to use, Arcata passed an actual ordinance, not just a resolution, pro-
hibiting its law enforcement officials from officially assisting or vol-
untarily cooperating with surveillance activities by federal agents who
employ the disapproved procedures.80 To give its ordinance teeth, the
Arcata City Council provided for a fine of $57 for violating the ordi-
nance, which applies only to the top nine managers of the city, in-
structing them that they must refer any Patriot Act investigation re-
quest to the City Council itself.81
To the extent that the Arcata ordinance might be read as instruct-
ing or allowing city officials to interfere with federal enforcement ef-
forts, it would be considered unconstitutional in light of the Suprem-
acy Clause. Regardless of a locality's negative opinion of the tactics
of federal officers, the locality cannot bind federal officers to its own
standards or enforce its own standards in a manner that impedes the
federal government's investigation. 82 But the word "cooperation" is
vague, and in light of Printz, loaded. Would it improperly impede
federal officers for Arcata employees to decline to provide them with
information about local residents from their own files or computer da-
tabase? To decline to allow them to use the office copy machine? To
decline to provide them with office space? It will be years before the
Supreme Court spells out the limits of what a locality may be required
to do, or not do, when operating in the no man's land between the
protection of the Printz anti-commandeering principle and the prohi-
bition of the Supremacy Clause. Meanwhile, the Arcata City Council
does seem to have some space in which to decide that it will not go
beyond required non-interference by providing assistance of the sort
that could not be commandeered.
What is clear is that the Arcata City Council, like the Portland
City Council, wanted to preserve for itself the responsibility to make
80. See, e.g., CITY OF ARCATA, CAL., ORDINANCE NO. 1339 (2003) at http://www.bordc.
org/detail.php?id=l 19 (last visited June 8, 2005) (Amending the Arcata Municipal Code to
Defend the Bill of Rights and Civil Liberties). See also Kevin Fagan, Arcata The Defiant,
Town Ordinance Penalizes Officials Who Cooperate with Patriot Act, but Law May Not Stand
Up in Court, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Apr. 13, 2003, at A17.
81. CITY OF ARCATA, CAL., ORDINANCE No. 1339 (2003) at http://www.bordc.org/de-
tail.php?id=1 19 (last visited June 8, 2005).
82. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (permitting federal officers
to use wiretap evidence obtained in violation of a Washington state statute).
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sure that things in Arcata are "going well" in their own estimation in-
stead of leaving the critical policy decisions to their executive branch
employees. If the City Council, rather than local executive officials,
considers federal agents' requests for assistance with Patriot Act au-
thorized investigations, it is possible that the debates over how far
such assistance should go will be no more visible to the public than
they would have been in a police department office. The federal in-
vestigations will still be shrouded in secrecy. But the decision will be
made in a forum with greater accountability and perhaps diversity of
viewpoint. And it will be made by the body the people of Arcata
have trusted with the authority to make policy. If their ordinance
does not violate the Supremacy Clause by going too far in the direc-
tion of actually interfering with federal investigators, is there anything
unconstitutional about the City Council compelling its employees to
abide by their policy decisions by fining them for violations?
83
B. New York City and Accountability
Not all local legislative bodies have been as assertive as the Port-
land and Arcata City Councils. In New York City, for example, the
City Council has allowed the executive branch to decide several sig-
nificant issues that have arisen about the relationship of federal and
city policies. First, the New York Police Department went to court to
seek relief from a pre-September 11 consent decree that had prohib-
ited it from sending undercover agents to infiltrate religious or politi-
cal organizations. 84 The litigation over this matter was complex and
went through several stages,85 but the City Council made no serious
attempt to wrest the policy decisions in question from the city's ex-
ecutive branch.86
Beginning in 1989 with an Executive Order issued by Mayor Ed
Koch, New York City had a sanctuary policy which provided that city
employees could not ask the immigration status of people they en-
83. The Second Circuit, in City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir.
1999), held that states do not have an "untrammeled" right to prohibit voluntary cooperation,
in a context discussed infra at text accompanying notes 87-92.
84. Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 273 F. Supp. 2d 327, 329-35 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
85. See Jerrold L. Steigman, Note, Reversing Reform: The Handschu Settlement in Post-
September 11 New York City, 11 J.L. & POL'Y 745, 765-70 (2003).
86. Several resolutions calling for oversight hearings were introduced, see, e.g., Res. No.
548, N.Y. City Council (2002), at http://webdocs.nyccouncil.info/textfiles/Res%200548-
2002.htm?CFID-474918&CFTOKEN=, but do not seem to have been enacted or to have led to
any actions on the part of the City Council.
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countered in the course of doing their jobs and, with limited excep-
tions, could not share with federal officials any information about
immigration status that they happened to acquire.87 In 1996, Congress
enacted a statute providing that no person or agency may prohibit, or
in any way restrict, a federal, state, or local government entity from
sending information regarding an individual's immigration status to
the federal immigration authorities [INS], maintaining such informa-
tion, or exchanging such information with any other federal, state, or
local government entity.88 Mayor Rudolph Giuliani challenged the
constitutionality of this statute as applied to New York City, arguing,
inter alia, that the Tenth Amendment entitled New York City to make
policy decisions respecting control of its own employees. 89 When the
court ruled that the federal law preempted the city's policy under the
circumstances presented by the case, Mayor Michael Bloomberg set
out on the difficult and politically charged task of forging a new pol-
icy. The city's sanctuary policy had been motivated by a concern that
undocumented aliens might fear to approach or cooperate with city
agencies if they were afraid that the City would turn them over to fed-
eral authorities for deportation, and that the City would therefore be
hampered in such functions as providing protection to crime victims
or obtaining the cooperation of witnesses.90 In his Executive Order,
the Mayor created a modified "Don't Ask, Do Tell" policy, attempt-
ing to accommodate the requirements of the federal statute and the lo-
cal policy objectives. 91 Throughout the deliberations and public dis-
87. New York City Mayoral Exec. Order No. 124 (Aug. 7, 1989) (providing that no New
York City officer or employee shall transmit information respecting any alien to federal immi-
gration authorities unless the disclosure was either required by law, authorized by the alien, or
respecting an alien suspected by the agency of criminal activity).
88. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, § 642, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-707 (1996).
89. City of New York v. United States, 179 F. 3d 29, 31-34 (2d Cir. 1999).
90. It is no coincidence, of course, that New York City is home to a large immigrant
population. For an opposing point of view on the desirability of and motivation for sanctuary
laws, see Heather MacDonald, The Illegal-Alien Crime Wave, 14 City Journal 46 (2004) (de-
scribing sanctuary laws as dangerous "pandering" to immigrant communities).
91. New York City Mayoral Exec. Order No. 41 (Sept. 17, 2003). The order authorizes a
New York City officer or employee to inquire about immigration status only if 1) that status is
necessary for determination of eligibility for some program, service, or benefit or 2) the officer
is required by law to make such inquiry. Law enforcement officers may not inquire about im-
migration status unless investigating criminal activity other than mere status as an undocu-
mented alien; police officers may not inquire about the immigration status of crime victims,
witnesses, or others seeking assistance, and may authorize disclosure of immigration status if
"such disclosure is necessary in furtherance of an investigation of potential terrorist activity.
The Mayor's original attempt at a revised policy, in May 2003, was narrower in a number of
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cussions about the content of this controversial policy, the New York
City Council considered weighing in, but did not actually do so.
92
The New York City Council did adopt a resolution opposing various
Patriot Act provisions, similar to the resolution adopted by Portland,
on February 4, 2004. 93
Other localities, of course, have different stories to tell. The City
of Los Angeles, for example, still has a policy opposing providing
immigration information to federal authorities. 94  Under this policy,
Special Order 40, a Los Angeles police officer who notifies federal
immigration authorities about an illegal alien picked up for minor vio-
lations faces disciplinary sanctions. 95 Los Angeles adopted a Bill of
Rights Defense Campaign resolution on January 21, 2004, around the
same time as New York City.
96
At the federal level, critics of the Bush administration anti-
terrorism policies have complained that Congress is not providing
sufficient oversight over the executive branch's investigations and
other operations.97 The same concern about unconstrained executive
authority should echo in state and local assemblies as well.
respects and met a public outcry, showing that executive officials are certainly also subject to
political accountability. Alisa Solomon, Don't Ask Don't Tell: Outcry Over New City Policy
on Reporting the Undocumented Stuns the Mayor, VILLAGE VOICE July 9, 2003, available at
http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0328,solomon,45387,1 .html.
92. See New York City Council, http://www.nyccouncil.info/ (last visited June 8, 2005).
93. Bill of Rights Defense Committee, http://www.bordc.org/detail.phpid=69 (last vis-
ited June 8, 2005).
94. Special Order No. 40 from LAPD Police Chief Daryl F. Gates (Nov. 27, 1979) (man-
dated by the Los Angeles City Council).
95. Id. The order also prohibits officers from "initiating police action where the objec-
tive is to discover the alien status of a person." Id.
96. Bill of Rights Defense Committee, http://www.bordc.org/detail.php?id=58 (last vis-
ited June 8, 2005).
97. See, e.g., Frank Davies, Patriot Act is Important Legacy of Sept. 11 Attacks, MIAMI
HERALD, Sept. 8, 2002 (noting the fear that the Patriot Act might "lead to domestic spying on
a large scale, with infringement of citizens' rights and little congressional oversight"); Rafael
Lorente, Attacks Left Americans Fearing for their Security and their Liberties, SUN-SENTINEL
(Fort Lauderdale, FL), Sept. 7, 2003, at Al (quoting Christopher Pyle, a professor at Mount
Holyoke College and a former Army Intelligence officer who worked for Senate Frank
Church's Select Committee on Intelligence, as fearing that "[w]e are in a situation now where
our fear of the terrorist threat has driven us to create the intelligence apparatus of a police
state," and as having argued that "modem computer technology, in the hands of an overzealous
Department of Justice with little congressional oversight, could be a dangerous new weapon");
First Things First, Editorial, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2004, at A24 (citing a report from the
American Enterprise Institute that demonstrates that "neither Congress nor the Bush admini-
stration ever conducted any real risk assessment or applied any real oversight" to the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security despite an "enormous amount of new funding").
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IV. PREEMPTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
The New York City sanctuary policy, no matter what branch of
the City government adopted it, was displaced by a federal statute in
which Congress valued federal interests-in enforcing immigration
law-above what the City had determined to be its own local inter-
est-in avoiding provision of incentives for undocumented aliens to
remain underground even if they became crime victims or necessary
witnesses. 98 The Second Circuit ruling that the federal statute pre-
empted the city policy, however, was quite narrow and left room for a
Tenth Amendment based argument that Congress may not interfere
with the city's ability to set policy for and control its own employ-
ees.99 The court found that neither the City nor the state had in fact
made a general policy decision about the need to protect confidential
information like immigration status. 100 The Executive Order creating
the sanctuary policy was very specific and provided only that one par-
ticular type of information-immigration status-could not be dis-
closed to one particular type of recipient-federal immigration offi-
cials. '0 1  If New York City or State were to adopt a general
confidentiality policy, the court suggested, a preemption argument
might then fail because federal interests, as Printz found, cannot be
exalted at the price of subjugating state or local employees and com-
pelling them to serve federal interests above the interests of their own
employer. 102
The power of the federal government to preempt state or local
law is restrained by the Tenth Amendment, but the contours of the
Tenth Amendment with respect to issues like these are far from fully
defined. The Supreme Court has decided only two cases explicating
its current view of the Tenth Amendment's anti-commandeering prin-
ciple. Before Printz, the Court had ruled, in New York v. United
States'0 3 that the Tenth Amendment prohibits federal commandeering
of a state legislature. In her opinion for the Court, Justice O'Connor
expressed a concern about accountability that was later reiterated in
Printz: If the federal government orders a state legislature to take a
certain action, how will voters know whom to blame if they dislike
98. 179 F. 3d 29, 32-33 (2d Cir. 1999).
99. See id. at 35-37.
100. See id. at 36-37.
101. See id.
102. Id. at 34-37.
103. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161-66 (1992).
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that action, or whom to diselect?10 4
The same concern could be raised about the revised New York
City sanctuary policy. If city residents are angry when a city em-
ployee discloses someone's immigration status to federal officials,
pursuant to federal request, the lines of accountability are blurred re-
gardless of whether the inquiry was mandatory. 10 5 City taxpayers pay
the salary of the employee but can control neither the employee's ac-
tions nor the use of information acquired working in an official capac-
ity. Even if city employees are not being "commandeered," because
they are not actually compelled by the federal government to do any-
thing, the city is being prohibited from creating policy that its em-
ployees must follow and from sanctioning them if they fail to follow
that policy. This means that the city council, the legislative branch,
cannot make final policy decisions and that executive branch officials,
perhaps even low level employees, will have the power to decide
when to disclose information to the federal government. Policy and
practice could vary among the city's agencies. Power shifts to the ex-
ecutive branch again, where decisions in individual cases may be
made in a manner invisible to the public and where the state or local-
ity's own decision about how to allocate policy making authority is
subverted.
There has been another interesting example of a judicial finding
of federal preemption of a state policy decision respecting the conduct
of the war on terror within that state. Among those detained by fed-
eral authorities in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 were some
762 "special interest" aliens, primarily men from Arab or South Asian
countries who were detained by the INS for some number of months
prior to their eventual deportation. 10 6 Many of these detainees were
housed in New Jersey jails, including the Hudson and Passaic County
jails, pursuant to a voluntary agreement the federal government had
previously entered with New Jersey state authorities to house federal
104. Id. at 168-69.
105. I have always had doubts about the persuasiveness of the public relations assump-
tions underlying Justice O'Connor's accountability argument. Local officials would be quick
to proclaim that they are acting under federal government compulsion and should not be
blamed for unpopular actions about which they had no choice. If local officials, like the
county sheriffs in Printz, have a choice about whether to cooperate with a federal program,
they may be subject to a public check on that decision if they are elected officials. The same
will not be true of all city employees, most of whom are appointed rather than elected.
106. Ronald K. Chen, State Incarceration of Federal Prisoners After September 11:
Whose Jail Is It Anyway?, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 1335, 1336 (2004).
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detainees in New Jersey's excess jail space.107
The Department of Justice refused to release the names of these
special interest detainees. 10 8 A lawsuit brought in New Jersey state
court, ACLU of New Jersey, Inc. v. County of Hudson,109 sought to
compel the sheriffs and wardens of the Hudson and Passaic jails to
comply with a long-standing provision of New Jersey state law man-
dating public disclosure of the identities of the inmates of New Jersey
jails. 1° The trial court granted the plaintiffs partial summary judg-
ment, ordering compliance with the state law after a limited stay of
ten days granted at the request of the United States (which had been
afforded defendant-intervenor status)."1 The United States promptly
filed an appeal of this decision; on the same day, April 17, 2002, INS
Commissioner James Ziglar signed an emergency interim regulation
superseding state law by prohibiting state jail officials from disclosing
the identities of the detainees held on behalf of the INS, whether by
contract or otherwise. The plaintiffs argued that the regulation ex-
ceeded the authority delegated to the Attorney General by Congress,
violated the Administrative Procedure Act in that there had been no
notice and comment period, and violated the Tenth Amendment.
112
The New Jersey appellate court held that New Jersey law had been
validly preempted and reversed the trial court's order of disclosure." 
3
As in the PJTTF, a local interest in the use of local resources-
here in the use of jail space paid for by New Jersey taxpayers-was
pitted against the federal interest in conducting the war on terror in
whatever manner the federal government deems appropriate-in this
case a claim of need for secrecy of the identities of detainees. As in
Portland, those who had to make decisions about the use of the local
resources had no meaningful way to evaluate the federal claim of
need. Because the federal claim was held to prevail, New Jersey was
left with the same choice as Portland: to deny the use of its local re-
107. Id. at 1338.
108. See Ctr. for Nat'l See. Studies v. United States Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 920
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (upholding refusal to make this information available under the Freedom of
Information Act).
109. ACLU of N.J., Inc. v. County of Hudson, 799 A.2d 629, 635 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2002).
110. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:8-16 (West 1997).
111. ACLU of N.J., 799 A.2d at 636.
112. Id. at639.
113. Id. at 655; see Chen, supra note 106 at 1339-45 (giving a full account of this litiga-
tion).
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sources to the federal government or to abide by the federal govern-
ment's impenetrable decisions about how those resources will be
used. Only by refusing to contract with the federal government for
use of New Jersey jail space could New Jersey implement its own
disclosure policies or preserve its own autonomy to make policy deci-
sions. As in Portland, a negotiated contract that would allow the
state's interest to be served would not be a likely result. The federal
government is as unlikely to cede to New Jersey the decision of when
it is appropriate for inmates to be held in secret or incommunicado as
it was to grant high level security clearances to Portland officials.
The joint enterprise is based on asymmetrical power and so the only
true power of the locality is to decline to participate at all.
One might question allowing a federal administrative official,
rather than Congress, the authority to preempt state law in such a per-
emptory fashion. 1 4 But the use of the preemption doctrine by the
New Jersey court in this case accomplished exactly what residents of
Portland feared-federal policy supplanted competing local concerns,
even when the state's own policy choices, providing a greater level
of protection than federal constitutional law would require, were em-
bodied in a statute. Portland residents feared even the subtle possi-
bilities for encroachment presented by a JTTF agreement that on its
face purported to honor state law. There was nothing subtle about the
federal government's blunt action with respect to the New Jersey sun-
shine law. The law was perceived as conflicting with the manner in
which the federal government wished to conduct the war on terror,
and so it was swept aside.
If Commissioner Ziglar could preempt New Jersey law in this
manner, without congressional action or even a notice and comment
period, could Attorney General Gonzales simply preempt the Oregon
law that the Portland City Council has been struggling to honor and
provide that participants in a PJTTF shall follow the more lenient fed-
eral rather than the more demanding state restrictions on their con-
duct? Would politics prevent the Attorney General from taking such
an action, making it unnecessary for the courts to define the limits of
the Tenth Amendment? If Portland remains the only jurisdiction to
have insisted on its autonomy, it is less likely that other jurisdictions
114. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Ap-
proach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 1313, 1329-30 (2004) (arguing that preemption
should be found only when Congress has expressly preempted state law or when federal and
state laws are mutually exclusive).
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would rise up to defend Portland's right to implement its own state
and local policies. If such a federal action were politically feasible,
would the Tenth Amendment be interpreted as limiting the federal
preemption power in the Oregon hypothetical or with respect to New
York City's sanctuary policy (assuming that policy were to meet the
condition of becoming part of a deeper rooted legislative scheme pro-
tecting privacy)?
How sharp is the line between commandeering and generous ap-
plication of the preemption doctrine? How sharp is the line between a
local policy that is more protective of rights than the federal Constitu-
tion requires and a local policy that conflicts with federal law or inter-
ests?
CONCLUSION
Because the examples given above all concern the conduct of the
"war" on terror, some will argue that our usual models of federalism
must give way to an extraordinary and exceptional need for federal
power. If the war powers can justify incommunicado detention of
citizens who have not been charged with or convicted of a crime' 1 5 or
allowing the government to withhold information about how it is us-
ing its surveillance powers, 1 6 perhaps even Justice Scalia would find
the Tenth Amendment prohibition against commandeering inconclu-
sive in this exceptional setting. If Article II war powers do provide a
basis for the FBI to commandeer Portland, Arcata, or New York City
law enforcement officials, then questions about how to draw bounda-
ries under Printz could become moot. I believe that it would be a
poor idea for the federal government to create exceptions to our usual
structures of federalism for this amorphous "war" of indefinite dura-
tion. 1 7 The examples of federal/state/local interactions discussed in
this article show the practical utility of federalism as a political rather
115. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2715-16 (2004) (leaving open the question
of whether incommunicado detention of United States citizen not charged with a crime is con-
stitutional).
116. See ACLU v. United States Dep't of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 21 (D.D.C. 2003);
ACLU v. United States Dep't of Justice, 321 F. Supp. 2d 24, 27 (D.D.C. 2004) (ruling that
government could claim a national security exemption to the Freedom of Information Act and
decline to divulge information about how or even how often Patriot Act surveillance powers
were being used).
117. See Richard T. Ford, Police Don't Fight Wars, 29 BOSTON REV. 1 (Dec. 2004),
available at http://bostonreview.netBR29.6/ford.html (suggesting that the war powers analogy
is inapt because local police do not fight wars).
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than a judicial doctrine. It is interesting that the Tenth Amendment
did not need to be called into play to require the Portland or Detroit
Chiefs of Police to interrogate Arab and Muslim men not suspected of
any crime or to authorize them to decline. The politics of the day
pressured many local law enforcement officials to cooperate. If most
communities agree with a federal program, isolated instances of rebel-
lion do not impede the federal program. It is feasible for the FBI to
send a few extra agents to Portland or Detroit if local agents cannot or
will not participate in their interrogation program in isolated spots. It
is only if many communities disagree with an FBI program that fed-
eral resources will be challenged. At that point, the FBI will be pres-
sured to change its tactics because it may not have the resources to
conduct a program that is widely unpopular. Thus federalism can act
as a popular check on federal tactics neither the courts nor Congress
have prohibited.1 8 The Bill of Rights Defense Committee resolutions
are one interesting source of information about what concerns people
around the country have about federal surveillance techniques. The
negotiations over JTTF's, at least in Portland, have been another.
Daniel Richman has argued that the political process of fed-
eral/state negotiations over the terms of JTTF participation will pro-
mote both accountability and effectiveness in the war on terror be-
cause local officials, having an important service to sell, will have the
bargaining power to insist on accountability and to protect their own
vision of the appropriate balance between security and liberty. 19 Un-
der this optimistic theory, one might argue that the same dialectic
could work to achieve a proper balance between state, local, and fed-
eral concerns about the local enforcement of immigration law and
other issues of apparent conflict. New Jersey, having jail space the
federal government desires, has the bargaining power to decide
whether to continue to contract with the federal government if the
state's policy about disclosure of the identities of residents is not to be
honored. And perhaps the political dialectic could generally act as a
"self-correcting constitutional compass"'' 20 that would inspire the fed-
eral government to take greater account of grass roots concerns about
providing adequate privacy for people's religious and political activi-
118. See Ann Althouse, The Vigor of Anti-Commandeering Doctrine in Times of Terror,
69 BROOK. L. REv. 1231, 1250-61 (2004).
119. See Daniel Richman, The Right Fight: Local Police and National Security, 29
BOSTON REV. 1 (Dec. 2004), available at http://bostonreview.net/BR29.6/richman.html.
120. See Burt Neuborne, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 725, 731 (1981).
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ties, library records, and Internet surfing.121
This view may be overly optimistic. One of the very few other
academic commentators to have focused on the role of local policing
in the war on terror, William Stuntz, predicts that the courts will not
find anything unconstitutional about the federal legislative powers
that communities like Portland, Arcata, and New York City have con-
demned and that, instead of operating as a brake on a federal jugger-
naut, states will then feel encouraged to board the bandwagon and
confer the same powers on themselves.
122
Perhaps pessimistically, I think that Stuntz is more likely to be
right in predicting a constitutional race to the bottom than Richman is
in predicting a happy synthesis resulting from the federalism dialectic
being conducted in the Portland City Council. For one thing, Portland
is no more typical of the rest of the country than Arcata. Only if there
were widespread opposition to federal policies would the federal gov-
ernment have to change its policies in any significant way, even if it is
inconvenient to negotiate individual deals. Furthermore, the fact that
so many MOU's are not public and so contracts between the federal
government and individual local governments cannot be compared
means that there is little possibility of collective action having an im-
pact. Private deals may exist that differ from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion, but if they are secret, other communities will not be inspired to
insist on a similar deal and the public may not be aware that so many
issues are being swept under the rug.
The fact that cities are not "sovereigns" in the same constitu-
tional sense that states are complicates the application of federalism
doctrine to most of the examples described above. In Printz, county
sheriffs, described as state employees, occasioned a discussion of fed-
eral interference with the state's sphere of operations. In many of the
examples described above, individual cities were objecting to tactics
their states may not have found objectionable. After the Portland City
Attorney expressed the opinion that the FBI's proposed questioning
of Arab and Muslim men would violate Oregon State law, and that it
would be recalled, lawyers for the county and state declared that it
would not.' 23 How much autonomy a city has will vary depending on
the state's local government law. One commentator has argued that
121. See Althouse, supra note 118, at 1250-61.
122. William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2156-60,
2181 (2002).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 28 and 33.
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our notions of federalism are actually an impediment to effective fed-
eral and local joint ventures because a state government with discrete
legal rights is interposed between the national government and the cit-
ies, the principal partners of federal law enforcement officials in anti-
terrorism efforts. 124 In the PJTTF example, the city was negotiating
directly with the FBI, but the state always looms in the background.
It is not surprising that the shock waves of the war on terror are
shaking relationships among political entities within the states. The
horizontal checks and balances among the three branches of the fed-
eral government have been profoundly shaken.' 25  As described
above, the vertical checks of federalism-the relationships among
federal, state, and local powers-are also being challenged, although
mostly in ways that are not generally apparent. The discussion of the
Portland debates about the problems created by even a heavily negoti-
ated MOU suggests that in most other cities where JTTF's operate,
some quantum of local power and money may well have been trans-
ferred to federal control, out of the view of the public. In times of na-
tional crisis, power tends to flow to the federal executive branch from
all directions, as if by centripetal force. What may be a surprising
outcome, and one no one seems to have observed, is that the same
forces that are leading to expanded presidential authority-the desire
to enable secret, coordinated, and prompt action-are leading to a
similar dislocation of power within municipalities. The discussion of
the PJTTF demonstrates how policy-making authority over anti-
terrorism investigations-including questions about how much power
and money to cede to the federal government and how vigorously to
implement special state or local protections of privacy and liberty-
tends to lodge in the executive branch of local governments instead of
the local policy making bodies. But not in Portland.
124. Edward Rubin, Federalism Won't Work, 29 BOSTON REV. 1 (Dec. 2004), available
at http:/Ibostonreview.net/BR29.6/rubin.html.
125. See Susan N. Herman, The USA Patriot Act and the USA Department of Justice:
Losing Our Balances?, THE JURIST (Dec. 4, 2001), at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum
/forumnew40.htm.
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